Everything we've built, the honest version.

What we tried

We took a single AI use case, wrapped it in a clean mobile app, and pushed it through App Store review, start to live listing.

What we learned

Shipping to the App Store is its own skill: review guidelines, subscriptions, and the cost of acquiring a user who'll never walk into your shop. Consumer AI is crowded and expensive to grow.

Why we pivoted

NattyAI proved we could ship consumer AI fast, but the longevity just wasn't there. Downloads spike and fade, retention is brutal, and there was nothing to keep it sticky. We took the lesson and moved on.

What we tried

We built the full stack: a consumer app, a venue dashboard, payment auth holds, and the backend to tie a phone tab to a real bar's POS.

What we learned

The tech worked, but the hard part was never the app. It was venue adoption. Bars move slow, the three-tier rules around alcohol are heavy, and onboarding one bar at a time is a grind that software alone doesn't solve.

Why we pivoted

Untabbed proved we could ship a real payments product end to end. Scaling it is the hard part: bars move slow and adoption takes time. But it's live, we're still at it, and it's growing.

What we tried

We wanted a tangible way to feel API spend instead of checking a dashboard. So we built a small LED meter that sits on your desk and ticks up as you burn tokens.

What we learned

This was our crash course in the hardware side: component costs, supply chains, lead times, assembly, and shipping. Making a physical product is a different game from software, and it taught us what it actually takes to build one and get it out the door.

Why we pivoted

It stayed a real product, but it taught us our edge is shipping fast and owning the whole stack, hardware included. That lesson now shapes everything we build.

What we tried

We took on real client builds end to end, shipping the whole connected system — site, booking, payments, reviews, and automation — for non-technical businesses that needed to get current.

What we learned

Client work pays, but it's a different business from building our own products. Every hour on someone else's roadmap is an hour off ours, and with just the two of us the two pull in opposite directions.

Why we pivoted

So we chose to focus our effort back on our own applications — the products we own and control end to end — rather than run an agency. The offering's still live if you want it, but our attention is on what we build for ourselves.

What we tried

We set one hard constraint — 100 apps, 100 hours — and shipped a real, standalone demo for each, posting every build the moment it went live.

What we learned

Volume is its own teacher. Racing the clock forced us to cut scope to what matters, reuse what we'd already built, and get comfortable shipping something real before it felt finished.

Why we pivoted

The run did its job: it kept our output high and showed, in public, which ideas actually had legs. The whole board is still live and ranked.

What we tried

We built the whole platform — a customizable political AI dashboard whose premier feature was that synthetic electorate, so a campaign could pre-test a message against a district before spending on a real poll.

What we learned

The tech was the easy part. We never got a sharp enough read on the market: who the buyer really was, when they'd pay, and how it fit into how campaigns actually run. Without that, the product-market fit didn't come together.

Why we pivoted

Electora proved we could ship a real AI SaaS end to end, but a strong product still needs a market that's ready for it, and ours wasn't clear enough. So we made the call to move on. The site's still live to explore, and the lesson pointed us straight at OperBot.